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THE HOWEY FORMULA REFINED
sions of the Act.6" Second, to allow minority self-help, even when the
union is not aiding the minority, would be inequitable to the employer.
In addition to the examples mentioned by ,the Court,6 the prejudice to
the employer is demonstrated by the fact that during the course of
collective bargaining, an employer will make concessions in order to
avoid the disruption of his business occasioned by employee picketing.
To allow minority employees -to picket him because of derelictions on
the part of the union is to injure him doubly. Therefore, industrial
peace will be preserved without undue interference with the rights of the
minority employees by prohibiting minority economic pressure in ac-
cordance with the decision in Emporium.
The decision in Emporium should not be read to indicate a weak-
ening of the Supreme Court's commitment to the eradication of racial
discrimination in employment. Rather, it evidences a balancing of
policy considerations, resulting in the emphasis of the smooth operation
of the federal system of labor relations at what the Court views as a
nominal inconvenience to the civil rights movement. If employee pro-
tection beyond that offered by the present provisions of Title VII is
needed, Congressional legislation is the proper solution. The Supreme
Court should not, and apparently has declined to, judicially redirect the
NLRA to achieve this result.
STEVEN WILLIAM SUFLAS
Securities Regulation-United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman: The Supreme Court Refines the Howey Formula
For the sixth time1 since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933,
the United States Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman2 has gone in search of a workable definition of "security." The
67. For a discussion of these and other alternative remedies see Note, Racial
Discrimination in Employment and the Remedy of Self-Help: An Unwarranted
Addition, 15 WM. &MARY L. REV. 615 (1974).
68. 420 U.S. at 67-69.
1. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959);
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967).
2. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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Depression-era Congress that passed the 1933 Act3 left the definition 4
unbounded in its haste to write legislation halting the virtually unregu-
lated5 traffic in speculative, groundless stock. 6  The Supreme Court
must walk along the penumbra of the Act, sorting those interests which
fall within its light from those without. If the interests the purchaser-
litigant holds are "securities" within the Act, he gets the advantage of a
federal forum7 and lenient fraud rules.8 For the issuer-litigant, inclusion
in the Act means that his securities must undergo a lengthy and expen-
sive registration or exemption process before they may reappear on the
market. The Court's principal tool for distinguishing a security from
other interests is the test developed in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,'0 which
finds a "security" whenever "the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others."" The Court in Forman refined the test so that now a
transaction comes within the definitional sections of the Securities Act
whenever investors are motivated to risk their capital by a significant,
realistic"2 expectation of substantial13 profits (capital appreciation or
3. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
4. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1933 Act]:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
The definition of "security" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (10), 15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], is virtually identical and for
present purposes the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the same. 421 U.S. at
847 n.12.
5. By 1933, all forty-eight states except Nevada attempted in some degree to
regulate the sale of securities. However, state "Blue Sky" laws, designed to halt
"speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'," Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917), were unable to cope with interstate sales.
6. See the parade of horribles in F. PECORA, WALL SrREET UNDER OATH (1939).
Mr. Pecora was counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency during
the 1933-1934 investigation of securities abuses.
7. 1933 Act, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
8. 1934 Act, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1975).
9. 1933 Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 301.
12. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
13. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
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participation in earnings)14 to come solely from the efforts of others.
Plaintiffs in Forman are residents of Co-Op City in the Bronx,
New York City. Reputed to be the largest housing cooperative' 5 in the
United States,'" the development's 200-acre site containing thirty-five
high rise buildings and 236 townhouses is home for approximately
50,000 people. The project was built between 1965 and 1971 primari-
ly with funds procured under the New York Private Housing Finance
Law, known as the Mitchell-Lama Act.1  The Act is designed to
encourage private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing by
providing them with long-term low interest mortgage loans and substan-
tial tax exemptions. In return, the developer must agree to operate the
facility "on a' non-profit basis," and to submit to state review of the
project.' s
Defendant United Housing Foundation (UHF) is a non-profit
amalgam of labor unions and civic groups formed to secure decent
housing for low and moderate income persons. UHF organized River-
bay Corporation to issue the Co-Op stock and to operate the project.
UHF contracted with its wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary, Communi-
ty Services, Inc. (CSI), to serve as general contractor for Co-Op City.
The Mitchell-Lama Act allowed UHF to lease only to low income
individuals who were approved by the state, with preference given to
veterans, the aged and the handicapped.' 9  In May, 1965, Riverbay
circulated an Information Bulletin"0 seeking to attract residents to Co-
Op City. To acquire an apartment, a prospective tenant had to pur-
chase 450 dollars worth of Riverbay stock for each room desired. There
14. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
15. In a cooperative, a corporation is formed to purchase an apartment building.
Tenants buy stock in the corporation entitling them to a lease in the apartment building
and a vote in the election of directors who manage the corporation. Miller, Cooperative
Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U.L. REv. 465 (1965). In a condominium
the owner is given fee title in the unit with all the tax advantages of home ownership.
The fee interest is restricted to the interior walls and the air space contained between
them; all other parts of the dwelling, such as the exterior walls, are held in common
ownership with the other owners. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or
Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1962).
16. Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
17. N.Y. Priv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 1 et seq. (McKinney 1962), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
18. 421 U.S. at 840-41.
19. Id. at 841 & n.1, 842.
20. The Bulletin estimated the total cost of the project, based on an anticipated
construction contract with CSI, to be 283.7 million dollars. Of this sum, 250.9 million
dollars (88.4 percent) was to be financed by a forty-year low interest mortgage loan
from the state. The remaining 32.8 million dollars (11.6 percent) was to be raised by
the sale of Riverbay stock to tenants. Id. at 843.
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was no possibility of capital appreciation on resale of the stock since a
departing tenant was required to offer the shares at their initial selling
price to Riverbay or to a state-approved prospective tenant. The
shares could not be pledged or encumbered and would descend, along
with the apartment, only to a surviving spouse. Each apartment was
entitled to one vote in the affairs of the cooperative irrespective of the
number of shares owned. The Bulletin stated that after construction
of the project, mortgage payments and current operating expenses
would be defrayed by the tenants' monthly rent. The Bulletin esti-
mated that the average monthly cost would be twenty-three dollars per
room. Several times during construction of Co-Op City, Riverbay se-
cured state approval and revised its contract with CSI to compensate
the latter for increased construction costs and expenses not reflected
in the Bulletin. To meet these increases, Riverbay procured 125 mil-
lion dollars in additional mortgage loans from the state. As a result,
the average monthly rental charges increased periodically, reaching al-
most forty dollars per room as of July, 1974.21
Faced with a rental charge that had skyrocketed to 73 percent
above that predicted in the Information Bulletin, purchasers of the Co-
Op stock sued in federal court alleging violations of section 17(a) of the
1933 Act and rule lOb-5 promulgated under the 1934 Act.22 Plaintiffs
claimed that the Bulletin misrepresented that CSI would absorb any
subsequent cost increases above the contract price, and that the Bulletin
failed to disclose material facts about CSI. 3 Defendants (UHF, CSI,
Riverbay, individual directors of these organizations, the State of New
York and the State Private Housing Finance Agency) moved to dismiss
for want of federal jurisdiction in that the Riverbay shares were not
"securities" within the definitional sections of the federal Securities Acts.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss based on "the
fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" that presented "the
insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs' claims in this federal court. '24 The
21. Id. at 845-46.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) promulgated under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
23. The alleged omissions are noted in 421 U.S. at 844 n.s. Plaintiffs also
presented a claim against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and ten pendent state law claims. However, the resolution of the
jurisdictional issue precluded a hearing on the merits of these causes. 421 U.S. at 845,
859-60.
24. 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). However, noted Judge Pierce "[f
ever there was a group of people who need and deserve full and careful disclosure in
connection with proposals for the use of their funds, it is this type of group. By law, they
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on two grounds. 5
Since the Information Bulletin called the shares "stock," the Second
Circuit first held that the Securities Acts, which explicitly include
"stock" in their definitional sections, were literally applicable. The court
reached the same result by alternatively concluding that the shares
plaintiffs held were "investment contracts" under the definitional sec-
tions of the Acts as identified by the profit test developed in Howey.26
The court of appeals found an expectation of profits sufficient to satisfy
Howey from three sources: 1) rental reductions resulting from the
income produced by commercial facilities that were also established at
Co-Op City (professional offices, parking spaces and community wash-
ing machines); 2) tax deductions; 27 and 3) savings resulting from Co-
Op City's low rent. 8
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the
Riverbay shares were not "securities" within the Securities Acts. The
majority began by calling attention to Congress' stated intent in defining
the term "security" in the 1933 Act "to include . . . the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security. 2 9  The Court rejected a literal reading of the
definitional section's inclusion of "stock," holding that form should be
disregarded in favor of substance and that the emphasis should be on
economic reality.30 However, said the Court, the name given to an
interest is not wholly irrelevant. As a matter of evidence, the name an
issuer appends to the interests he sells may be relevant to show that
investors justifiably assume that the federal securities laws apply. In the
present case, however, "[c]ommon sense suggest[ed] that people who
intend to acquire only a residential apartment . . for their personal
would not be eligible for occupancy in Co-op [sic] City unless their financial resources
were limited. . . The cost of housing demands a good percentage of their incomes.
Their savings are most likely to be minimal, and they probably don't have lawyers or
accountants to guide them. Further, they are people likely to put a great deal of
credence in statements made. . . by reputable civic groups and labor unions, particularly
when the proposal is stamped with the imprimatur of the state." Id. at 1125.
25. 500 F.2d 1246 (1974).
26. Id. at 1252-53.
27. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 216 allows Co-Op City tenants to deduct their
proportionate share of real estate taxes paid by the cooperative housing corporation on
the land and buildings, and for interest paid by the corporation on its indebtedness under
the contract of acquisition, construction and maintenance. A tenant who used his
apartment for business purposes could depreciate the portion of the building used in a
trade or business or for the production of income.
28. 500 F.2d at 1254.
29. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (emphasis added).
30. 421 U.S. at 848, citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
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use, are not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing invest-
ment securities simply because that transaction is evidenced by some-
thing called a share of stock."31  The Court also held that a Riverbay
share was not an investment contract since a crucial element of the
Howey test-profit-was found lacking. The Court undertook to
define profit as "capital appreciation" or a "participation in earnings
resulting from the use of investors' funds."32  Two of the indicia of
profit used by the court of appeals were rejected summarily. The tax
benefits, said the Court, "are nothing more than that which is available
to any homeowner who pays interest on his mortgage." 3 The reduced
rental charge, which the Court attributed to the state's mortgage loan,
"no more embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare
benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies."' 4  The Court
admitted that income from the commercial leases "is the kind of profit
traditionally associated with a security investment."35 However, it
found this income "far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the
entire transaction within the Securities Acts.""0
The term "investment contract," which has become the outer edge
of at least one facet of the federal definition of "securities," came into
the 1933 Act via37 the Uniform Sale of Securities Act.3 8 When the
31. 421 U.S. at 851.
32. Id. at 852.
33. Id. at 855.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 856.
36. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and White, dissented in an
opinion supportive of the Second Circuit's reasoning. Id. at 860.
37. "With regard to the subject of definitions, I may say that we have attempted to
follow the Uniform Sale of Securities Act; and so when we come to the definition of
securities I think you will find that we have taken almost verbatim the language of the
Uniform Sale of Securities Act." Testimony of Houston Thompson, one of the drafters
of H.R. 4314 (which definition was used in the conference bill, H.R. 5480, the Securities
Act of 1933). Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1933).
38. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CoNFEREcNE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws 171, 173 (1929). UNIFORM SALE OF SECURITIES AcT § 1(1):
"Security" shall include any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation, or right to sub-
scribe to any of the foregoing, certificates of interest in a profit-sharing agree-
ment, certificates of interest in an oil, gas or mining lease, collateral trust cer-
tificate, pre-organization certificate, pre-organization subscription, any transfer-
able share, investment contract, or beneficial interest in title to property,
profits or earnings or any other instrument commonly known as a security; in-
cluding an interim or temporary bond, debenture, note, certificate, or receipt
for a security or for subscription to a security.
The Act was withdrawn by the commissioners in 1943 to be replaced in 1956 with the
Uniform Securities Act. As of 1974 this legislation has been adopted in some form by
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia, including North Carolina. HANDBoOK
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Uniform Commissioners picked up the term in 1929, it had already
acquired a fixed judicial definition.3 9 The leading case interpreting the
phrase was State v. Gopher Tire and Rubber Co.,4" which held that an
investment contract was created whenever an issuer "sold its certificates
to purchasers who paid their money justly expecting to receive an
income or profit from the investment ... .
The Supreme Court first confronted "investment contracts' in SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.42 Defendant Joiner acquired leases to
3,002 acres of McCulloch County, Texas, to drill an oil well. In order
to finance drilling, Joiner offered sub-leases of parcels ranging in size
from -two and one-half to twenty acres. The sub-leaseholds would
appreciate astronomically if oil were struck. Mr. Justice Jackson chose
not to define "investment contract," holding rather that "the reach of the
[Securities] Act does not stop at the obvious and commonplace. Novel,
uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered
or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their
character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security." "',4 Mr. Justice Murphy
crystallized the definition of investment contract three years later when
he wrote the Howey opinion.44 "[An investment contract for purposes
of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. . .."45
State courts began to chafe under the restrictive federal definition.
Judge Traynor was the first to break away in Silver Hills Country Club
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNiFoRM STATE LAws 1013,
1024 (1974). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -64 (1975).
39. People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, -, 12 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Dist. Ct. App.
1932).
40. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
41. Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938. One can argue that the Supreme Court's restrictive
definition of profit was alien to the Gopher court and the framers of the 1933 Act.
Purchasers of certificates in Gopher received monetary dividends and a ten percent
discount on all purchases from the issuer. Chancellor Lees arguably used the alternative
form "income or profits" in his definition to distinguish cash returns (income) from non-
monetary benefits (profits). However, this argument does not take into account the
philosophy of Blue Sky laws, which is generally more paternalistic than that of the
federal Securities Acts.
42. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
43. Id. at 351.
44. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
45. Id. at 298-99.
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v. Sobieski46 in which he developed the "risk capital" approach. Pro-
moters in Silver Hills were selling memberships in a yet to be developed
country club to the public. Judge Traynor held that those who risked
their capital along with others in a common venture in the expectation
of some benefit-not restricted to monetary profit-were entitled to the
protection of California's Blue Sky law. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
followed this lead in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,4' with the best
articulated alternative to the Howey test. The court held that for
purposes of the Hawaii Act, an investment contract is created whenever:
"(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a
portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the
offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above
the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the opera-
tion of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the
right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial
decisions of the enterprise."'48
The Forman Court's definition of profit as capital appreciation or
participation in earnings constitutes a rejection of the broader benefit
analysis undertaken in Silver Hills and Hawaii Market. Judge Traynor
in Silver Hills held that purchasers of the country club memberships
were entitled to the protection of the securities laws "whether or not they
expect[ed] a return on their capital in one form or another. '4 9 The
Supreme Court of Hawaii adopted this reasoning when it required for
application of the state Blue Sky law only that purchasers have a
reasonable expectation "that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue . . . ."5 Plaintiffs in Forman
advocated a similar benefit profit analysis, urging the Court to accept as
profit the savings of money that might otherwise have gone for more
expensive housing and higher taxes. The Court rejected this argument,
however, stating that such a finding would be overly broad, in that a
desire to obtain the greatest amount at least cost "characterizes every
form of commercial dealing."51
The Court's requirement and definition of "profits" in Forman has
the effect of clarifying and constricting the already narrow Howey prof-
46. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
47. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
48. Id. at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 109.
49. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
50. 52 Hawaii at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
51. 421 U.S. at 858.
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its test. The added requirement that investors be motivated to risk their
capital by a significant, realistic expectation of a profit excludes those
interests that attract consumers rather than investors. Purchasers who
buy an interest with the intent to realize enjoyment through use of the
interest are consumers. They cannot at the same time, the Court
implied, have a significant, realistic expectation of realizing Howey-type
profit on their investment. This follows despite the fact that many
interests will show capital appreciation upon resale, regardless of use
during ownership. 52
In discussing the net income derived from leasing Co-Op City
space to commercial facilities as "too speculative and insubstantial to
bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts"53 the Court
served notice that only the expectation of substantial profits will trigger
inclusion of an interest in the Acts. This introduces a threshold concept
into the securities definition absent from previous cases that may give
the Court and the securities bar additional headaches. The threshold of
substantial profits in Forman was to be considered in relation to the
volume of income the project generated. True, said the Court,54 the
commercial leases bring in more than one million dollars per year, but
this sum is a gross income figure calculated before expenses are netted
out. In any case, the majority believed that the net income from com-
mercial leases was insignificant in relation to Co-Op Citys' total income.
Despite the vagueness that such a threshold concept introduces, it is in
harmony with the Court's purpose of looking beyond form to economic
reality. Where the profit element is such a minor inducement to
potential purchasers as it was in the Forman case, the Court does not
believe that the potentially burdensome protections of the Securities Acts
are warranted.55
Among the unstated assumptions of the Court in Forman was the
52. An exception to this rule is the sale of interests in certain resort condominiums
and cooperatives, which interests the SEC treats as securities. This result follows where
the interests are offered and sold with the emphasis on the economic benefits to be
derived by purchasers from the managerial interest of others through participation in a
rental pool arrangement. Here the SEC apparently believes that the character of the
issuer's offering is so compelling that purchasers must have a significant, realistic
expectation of profit from the transaction. Release No. 5347, Securities Act of 1933, 38
Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
53. 421 U.S. at 856.
54. Id.; see note 22 supra.
55. The requirement of substantial profit would seem to undercut the SEC's
inclusion of all resort condominium offerings which meet the tests in Release No. 5347,
note 52 supra, in the Securities Acts. Arguably, only those plans in which the income a
purchaser can receive from rental pooling is substantial qualify as securities.
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idea that the Securities Acts should only take cognizance of investment
risk taking. Since to date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op
City has received back its full original payment, the Court found that
Co-Op purchasers "take no risk in any significant sense." 6 It is true
that plaintiffs do risk loss of their initial investment if Co-Op City
becomes bankrupt. But, said the Court, in view of the state's 375
million dollar sunken investment, "bankruptcy in the normal sense is an
unrealistic possibility." 51  Plaintiffs in Forman risked only the loss of
the benefit of their bargain, a risk the Court says is unlike the kind of
fluctuating value risk associated with securities investments.5 8
Another consideration that may have influenced the Court was the
risk of ruinous civil liablilty that non-profit issuers like Co-Op City face
under the Securities Acts, even if they are exempted from disclosure
requirements of registration. This risk could frighten away charitable
organizations from participation in similar future ventures. The most
fearsome of these civil liabilities arises under rule 10b-5, promulgated
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which makes it illegal to engage
in any manipulative or deceptive practices in connection with the sale of
any security. The rule also forbids the making of any untrue statement
of material fact, or the omission of any fact necessary to prevent a
statement from being misleading.59 While the amount of scienter that
plaintiff must show to establish a lOb-5 cause of action is unsettled, it is
clearly less than that required for common law fraud.60 The require-
ment of reliance on the misrepresented fact or material omission appears
to have been relaxed,61 and the Supreme Court has held that in consid-
ering the causal link between defendant's actions and plaintiff's loss,
the fraud need only "touch" the sale of the securities.62 Although the
Court disposed of Forman on the jurisdictional issue, had plaintiffs
penetrated this first line of defense it appears that they would have had
no difficulty surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under IOb-5.
56. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
60. Compare Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) with White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
61. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Reliance was presumed where the device employed was
such as would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon. However, the case involved an
enforcement action by the SEC rather than a private suit for damages.
62. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
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The Court may have also worried that inclusion of the Co-Op
interests in the Securities Acts would confer on the SEC jurisdiction
that might interfere with other state and federal regulatory schemes. The
Co-Op City interests are functionally similar to real property interests,
and the regulation of real property in our federal system has traditional-
ly been entrusted to the states. In addition, said the Court, New York's
Housing Commissioner reviewed "virtually every step" in the develop-
ment of Co-Op City.63 Given an existing state regulatory mechanism
operating in an area traditionally the domain of the states, the Court
may have been reluctant to impose on this project a competing regulato-
ry scheme. While no federal agency presently regulates condominium
and cooperative housing such as that involved in Forman, the Court
noted64 that Congress recently ordered the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development to conduct a thorough review of these relatively
new property interests. 65 HUD was named as lead agency and the
SEC was given no role in the study. If the exclusive choice of HUD
for the investigation represents Congressional intent rather than Con-
gressional oversight, the SEC's limited jurisdiction over resort condo-
miniums and cooperatives68 may soon terminate.
Two significant and related trends emerge from the Forman deci-
sion. First, the majority opinion represents a significant narrowing of
the Howey test. For an interest to be classified as a security after
Forman, it must produce capital appreciation upon resale or periodic
returns on the investment, in substantial amounts, and purchasers must
have a significant, realistic expectation of such profits. The second
trend, the result of the narrowing of Howey, is the closing of the
Securities Acts to consumer interests like those involved in Forman.
The Court has clearly pronounced that consumers must look elsewhere
than to the Securities Acts for protection.
W. WooDs DOSTER
63. 421 U.S. at 841.
64. Id. at 859 n.26.
65. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 89 Stat. 740.
66. See note 46 supra.
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